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 The transfer of ownership of securities has historically 
been accomplished through the use of public exchanges, such 
as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ, 
which are subject to stringent statutory and regulatory 
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regulations. Typically, investors purchase and sell equity 
securities on exchanges based on current available pricing data. 
Large purchases or the unloading of shares on the open market 
may result in a substantial increase or diminution in the price 
of the shares. Large institutional investors such as mutual funds 
and the like are wary of making sizeable investments in 
particular securities because such investments may then cause 
the securities to fluctuate considerably and the price may be 
negatively affected.  
 
 To address this concern, “dark pools of liquidity” – or, 
simply “dark pools” – arose as a form of an alternative trading 
system (“ATS”)1 in an effort to avoid national trading systems. 
Using dark pools, financial institutions are able to conceal the 
trades until they are placed. This practice avoids tipping their 
intentions and avoids a run-up or downturn of the securities 
prior to the trades.2 Dark pools now account for more stock 
trades than the NYSE, although it is worth noting that the 
NYSE set up a dark pool of its own as a one-year pilot Retail 
Liquidity Program in 2012.3 Although the word “dark” in 
connection with dark pools (as the word “shadow” in shadow 
banking) connotes seemingly sinister transactions, no such 
implication should be ascribed to these methodologies of 
providing liquidity to financial transactions. 
 
 The methodologies of using these alternative platforms, 
abuses, and possible remedial alternatives were highlighted in a 
number of books, including Scott Patterson’s Dark Pools4, 
which discussed computerized trading algorithms, the history 
of dark pools, and the systems in place such as the Island, 
Datek, and Tradebot systems. The “Flash Crash” of 2010 is a 
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recent example of where, in a matter of a little more than a half 
hour, the stock market index collapsed, falling about 1,000 
points (although the losses were later rapidly regained) due to 
the errant activity of a singular trader. By using algorithms, the 
trader allegedly placed many thousands of S&P stock index 
futures contracts with the intent of later disposing of them. 
High frequency traders (“HFTs”) apparently also were able to 
take advantage of the wild fluctuations in pricing that came as 
a result of the manipulation. The crash led to a Report of the 
Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee, which made a series of 
recommendations in an endeavor to curb abuses and harm to 
investors.5 
 
 The abuses of HFTs were more particularly brought to 
light by Michael Lewis’ Flash Boys,6 whose iconic book was a 
best seller that was discussed in numerous communications 
outlets. The book highlighted how the construction of a $300 
million, 827-mile fiber-optic link through mountains and rivers 
from the Chicago Mercantile exchange to NASDAQ gave high 
frequency trading firms, which most often used dark pools for 
trading, a significant trading advantage by its slight (1 to 4.5 
milliseconds) but vital communication time advantage.7 The 
book’s release and the uproar that followed led to 
investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 
possible insider trading violations and other violations under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Separately, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) undertook an in-depth review 
of the adequacy and possible need for additional regulatory 
safeguards to protect investors.8  
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PROS AND CONS OF DARK POOLS 
 
 The initial raison d’etre for dark pools was to safeguard 
investors, particularly those participating in mutual funds and 
pension plans, from seeing their investments altered by 
potential adverse price fluctuations brought about by large 
institutional trades.9 By utilizing approximately 45 dark pools 
engaged in trades, the orders placed were anonymous, which 
came to light some period after the trades had taken place. 
Using dark pools realized cost savings from exchange trading 
fees exacted by public exchanges, stability of pricing, and 
reduction of risk. The HFTs were able to purchase shares a 
microsecond before a share order, e.g., by pension funds, a 
microsecond before the public order of shares became public, 
profiting from the slight rise or fall in the purchase price 
thereby altering the price of the shares.10 Nevertheless, there 
has been much rethinking concerning whether the regulatory 
permissiveness of dark pools encourages misbehavior that may, 
in fact, outweigh the alleged advantages of HFTs. The 
remarkable growth of dark pools, which now constitute 40 
percent of all U.S. stock trades, has led some to question 
whether the negative consequences of dark pool trades 
outweigh the intended good results.11  
 
 There are obvious adverse results of dark pools’ 
permissiveness. Investors purchasing or selling shares on “lit” 
exchanges may encounter a mispricing of the shares inasmuch 
as large dark trades may substantially impact the price 
thereof.12 Based upon the multi-trillion dollar sums of all 
trades, a small mispricing brings about substantial financial 
consequences. The volume of such trades inevitably brings 
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about malfeasance such as: insider trading; diminution of 
income to public exchanges, such as the NYSE, which are 
highly regulated; less opportunity for investors utilizing public 
exchanges; lack of data required from brokers before the 
execution of a trade; favoritism of valued large institutional 
traders; and a general lack of information normally made 
available to individual investors.13  
 
 There are contrary views, as in any controversial area of 
research. Haoxiang Zhu of MIT, in an exhaustive mathematical 
analysis, concluded that rather than being harmful for price 
discovery, “under natural conditions, the addition of a dark 
pool concentrates informed traders on the exchange and 
improves price discovery.”14 He observed that improved price 
discovery on the exchange coincided with exchange liquidity, 
that delay costs hamper liquidity traders from crossing from 
one venue to another, and that dark pool price discovery 
becomes weaker the longer the information is delayed from the 
public.15 In another lengthy mathematical analysis of dark 
pools concerning the effect of undisplayed liquidity on market 
quality and fair access to sources of undisplayed liquidity, the 
authors concluded that dark pool crossing networks increase 
liquidity only “when it is added to a dealership market where 
traders cannot compete for the provision of liquidity by 
submitting limit orders.” When a dark pool is added to a Limit 
Order Book, orders tend to shift to the dark market, which thus 
offers market participants order migration rather than order 
creation. The depth and volume deteriorates on the Limit Order 
Book while total volume increases.16 High depth and small 
spread increase traders’ use of dark pools.  
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REGULATION OF DARK POOLS 
 
Regulation Alternative Trading Systems 
 
In 1988, Regulation Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) 
was the first major regulatory enactment governing ATS 
adopted by the SEC. It permitted ATSs to choose whether to 
register with the Commission as national securities exchanges 
or as broker-dealers.  It also required ATSs to comply with 
certain additional requirements, concerning amending their 
books and records based upon their activities and trading 
volume.17 The purposes of the regulation were to strengthen the 
public markets for securities, while encouraging innovative 
new markets mainly due to the incorporation of new 
technologies designed to give investors additional services 
more efficiently and at a lower cost.  The regulation provided a 
new regulatory framework for ATSs, addressed the disparities 
affecting investor protection and the markets as a whole due to 
the heretofore operation as private markets outside the national 
market system, available only to chosen subscribers regulated 
as broker-dealers, provided adequate surveillance for market 
manipulation and fraud due to the ATSs lack of obligation to 
provide investors a fair opportunity to participate in the ATSs 
or to treat their participation fairly and ensured that the ATSs 
are sufficient to handle rapid increases in trading volume, 
especially in times of market volatility.18 
 
 The regulation thus provided an incentive for the 
growth of ATSs by granting an exemption from the onerous 
regulatory requirements governing stock exchanges. The 
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statutory definition of an “exchange” under Rule 3b-16 was 
revised from that of a “market place or facilities for bringing 
together purchasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise 
performing with respect to securities the function commonly 
performed by a stock exchange”19 to mean any organization, 
association, or group of persons that “brings together the orders 
of multiple buyers and sellers and uses established, non-
discretionary methods…under which such orders interact with 
each other, and the buyers and sellers entering such orders 
agree to the terms of a trade.”20 The Rule excludes systems that 
perform only traditional broker-dealer activities, i.e., 
“(1) systems that merely route orders to other facilities for 
execution; (2) systems operated by a single registered market 
maker to display its own bids and offers and the limit orders of 
its customers, and to execute trades against such orders; and 
(3) systems that allow persons to enter orders for executions 
against the bids and offers of a single dealer.21  
 
 To be exempt from registration as an exchange under 
the ATS Rule, an ATS is required to be registered as a broker-
dealer and file an initial operation report and appropriate 
amendments for major changes.22 It must also: display 
subscriber orders, if it has an order volume of five percent or 
more of a security; provide national securities exchanges the 
prices and sizes of the highest buy price and lowest sale price 
of the covered security; establish written standards for granting 
access to trading on its system; and establish procedures to 
ensure adequate systems capacity, integrity, and contingency 
planning wherein the ATS exercises 20 percent or more of 
trading volume in any single security.23 
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Regulation NMS 
The SEC adopted Regulation NMS in 2005,24which 
imposed substantive rules to modernize the U.S. equity markets 
in the light of the expansion of both new and expanded 
developments therein.25 It adopted the “Order Protection Rule” 
that requires trading centers to establish, maintain, and enforce 
(with exceptions) written policies and procedures to prevent 
execution of trades at lower prices to those protected quotation 
displayed at other trading centers. The regulation provides that 
a quotation must be immediately and automatically accessible 
to investors. The “Access Rule” provides the requirement of a 
fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations and a limit on 
access fees to harmonize the pricing of quotations across 
different trading centers. It also requires each national 
securities exchange to adopt policies prohibiting members from 
acting in a pattern or practice of displaying quotations that lock 
or cross automated quotations. 
 
 A third rule, the “Sub-Penny Rule,” prohibits market 
participants from accepting, ranking, or displaying orders, 
quotations, or indications of interest in a pricing increment 
smaller than a penny, except for orders, quotations, or 
indications of interest that are priced at less than $1.00 per 
share. The SEC also adopted amendments to the “Market Data 
Rules” by updating requirements for consolidating, 
distributing, and displaying market information, as well as 
amendments to the joint industry plans for disseminating 
market information that modify the formulas for allocating plan 
revenues, the so-called Allocation Amendment, and broaden 
participation in plan governance, the so-called Governance 
Amendment.26 
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Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (SCI) 
 
 The SEC adopted Regulation Systems Compliance and 
Integrity,27 which applies in part to ATSs that trade NMS and 
non-NMS stocks exceeding a designated volume, to reduce the 
occurrence of systems issues, to improve the resiliency of 
systems problems, and to enhance SEC oversight in order to 
strengthen the technology infrastructure of the US securities 
markets. It requires that the SCI entities adopt certain policies 
and procedures to ensure that they have the levels of capacity, 
integrity, resiliency, availability, and security to maintain their 
operational capability and promote fair and orderly markets. 
These entities are: required to take corrective action in the 
event of systems disruptions and related issues; notify the SEC 
and market participants of such occurrences; conduct annual 
internal review of qualified personnel; submit quarterly reports; 
and maintain certain books and records.28  
 
Proposed Regulatory Amendments to NMS ATSs 
 
 On November 18, 2015, the SEC proposed rules that 
would substantially affect ATSs that trade stocks on listed 
national market system (NMS) stocks on national securities 
exchanges.29 The purpose of the proposed regulation is to 
enhance operational transparency and regulatory oversight of 
ATSs, which includes dark pools. The regulation requires 
disclosures on a proposed Form ATS-N, which includes 
information concerning the trading of NMS stocks, the types of 
orders and market data used on the ATS and its execution and 
priority procedures. The disclosures will be made publicly 
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available on the SEC website to enable market participants to 
have more complete knowledge of how decisions and actions 
are made by their brokers and to determine whether to make 
use of ATSs. The SEC can then make a determination whether 
or not to qualify ATSs for exemptions under existing 
regulations from the more onerous requirements of 
exchanges.30  
 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
 
 The major efforts of the regulatory authorities are 
designed to ensure transparency of trades of securities so that 
investors have an accurate reflection of the true market price of 
particular securities.31 One of the consequences of dark pools’ 
trading in securities is that large traders are able to secure 
major positions in companies without the knowledge of 
investors until after purchases, thus avoiding a substantial 
increase or decrease in the value of the shares that would 
otherwise take place if accomplished openly.32 The SEC is 
cognizant of the manipulation of shares that almost inevitably 
take place, particularly by individuals or firms trading on inside 
information.  
 
SAC Capital Hedge Fund 
 
 The indictment of individuals of SAC Capital hedge 
fund, including Matthew Martoma and other employees of the 
firm, concerning inside information that allegedly enabled the 
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firm to make very sizeable profits illustrates how dark pool 
funding enables such firms to reap profits through increases or 
decreases of large positions in a company before it becomes 
openly known to the investment community.33 Martoma, who 
was SAC Capital’s portfolio manager with respect to 
investment decisions in health care industries, ascertained 
information that a particular drug to alter Alzheimer’s disease 
was not effective, which then enabled SAC Capital to illegally 
gain hundreds of millions in profits – and secured a $9 million 
bonus for Martoma – by shorting 17.7 million shares of Elan 
and Wyeth stock worth $700 million. He received a nine-year 
prison sentence and loss of gains and other assets.34 
 
Pipeline Trading System 
 
 The SEC instituted a series of enforcement actions 
consisting mainly of cease-and-desist orders coupled with 
significant fines against a number of firms engaged in activities 
involving dark pool transactions. The first action taken by the 
SEC against a dark pool trading platform was against Pipeline 
Trading Systems and two of its senior officers for failing to 
disclose to customers that the vast majority of orders received 
by it were filled by an affiliate of Pipeline. The company 
settled the action by a payment of $1 million fine by the firm 
and $100,000 each by its founder and chief executive officer as 
well as by its former president. Pipeline made alleged false 
claims that its trading platform was a “crossing network” that 
matched customer orders with those from other customers, 
thereby providing “natural liquidity.” The alleged falsity 
consisted of the fact that its parent company owned a trading 
entity that filled the vast majority of customer orders on 
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Pipeline’s system. Other charges included alleged conflict of 
interest that resulted from paying the affiliate’s traders using a 
formula that rewarded them in part for giving favorable prices 
to Pipeline’s customers – which information was concealed 
from its customers – as well as falsely stating it treated all users 
the same and failing to protect customer’s confidential trading 
information.35  
 
Barclays and Credit Suisse 
 
 More onerous actions were taken against Barclays 
Capital Inc. and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC. Barclays 
Capital Inc. was accused of willfully violating §17(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, §15(c)(3) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Regulation ATS, Rule 301(b)(2). Section 
17(a)(2) of the ’33 Act makes it unlawful to obtain money or 
property by means of an untrue statement of material fact or 
omission. Section 15(3)(3) of the 1934 Act, and the SEC Rules 
thereunder, require that a broker/dealer possess risk 
management controls and supervisory procedures reasonably 
designed to prevent entry of orders exceeding appropriate pre-
set credit or capital thresholds for each customer. Regulation 
ATS, Rule 301(b)(2) requires certain designated forms be filed 
at least prior to 20 days before commencing operation as an 
ATS and when implementing a material change to its operation 
when such material becomes inaccurate.  
 
Specifically, Barclays was accused of making 
misleading statements and omissions of material facts 
concerning the operation of its LX product feature entitled 
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Liquidate Profiling, which it alleged was a powerful tool to 
protect against predatory trading. 36 It was also alleged that 
Barclays failed to establish adequate safeguards and procedures 
to protect subscribers’ confidential information and other 
related representations of its LX product. 37 As a result, a 
consent order was entered into by the parties, which prevented 
Barclays from causing present and future violations of the said 
Rule of the Exchange Act and included a censure and a fine of 
$35 million.38 In the New York Attorney General’s complaint, 
which preceded that of the federal government, the allegations 
were comparable to that of the U.S. Attorney General, which 
resulted in an installation of an independent monitor at 
Barclays to conduct an independent review of Barclays’ 
electronic trading business and further reforms to comply with 
New York law.39  
 
 In January 2016, there were two proceedings against 
Credit Suisse Securities that resulted in comparable orders of 
cease-and-desist and censure, together with fines of $20 
million and $10 million respectively.40 The allegations 
concerned alleged obtaining money or property by means of 
making false statements or omissions thereof; failing to file 
timely amendments to required forms after implementing a 
material change to the operation of the ATS; limitation to fair 
access to services offered by the ATS by applying standards in 
an unfair or discriminatory manner; and proper executions of 
orders to buy or sell securities. There are pending or settled a 
multitude of additional SEC enforcement actions.41  
 
 The New York State Attorney General (“AG”) has been 
particularly active in initiating proceeds against Barclays and 
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Credit Suisse.  The AG sued the companies under New York’s 
Martin Act,42 which gives wide-ranging powers to the Attorney 
General’s office to investigate and prosecute securities-related 
fraud and malfeasance. Section 352-c makes it a crime to 
commit fraud, deception, concealment, suppression, false 
pretense, and promise with respect to the purchase or sale of 
securities, operate falsely as an exchange, and other related 
offenses. The prosecutions by the Attorney General’s Office 
have evoked controversy in what appears to be overstepping 
the SEC for conduct ordinarily prosecuted by the SEC. With 
the new administration commencing January 20, 2017, there is 
a movement to curtail the powers of states to act against 
alleged securities fraud. Similarly, allegations made against 
Credit Suisse resulted in fines and comparable resolution.43  
 
 Commentators at the Wharton School of Finance and 
the University of Missouri-Kansas City suggested that the fines 
represented the cost of poor enforcement of existing laws and 
the failure to create precedents as deterrents. They opined that 
regulators should better scrutinize HFT including dark pools in 
order to identify systemic risks, if any. Regulators, in their 
views, should not settle cases but rather should fully prosecute 
the charges alleged even if they should not prevail in order to 
create precedents to thwart potential future misbehavior. It 
cited New York State Attorney General’s Eric Schneiderman, 
who stated that Barclays exposed its clients to predatory traders 
rather than protected them. It failed to police its dark pool and 
misled subscribers about data feeds.44  
 
 There are technological efforts by the U.S. government 
to better gauge when unlawful insider trading takes place. 
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Thus, it has instituted a national market system plan to create a 
comprehensive database called the “consolidated audit trail” 
(CAT), which is designed to enable government regulators to 
track all trading activity within the U.S. equity and options 
markets. CAT requirements include compelling self-regulation 
organizations and broker-dealers to identify all customers and a 
complete life cycle of all orders and transactions therein. It 
requires that a plan processor create a central repository that 
would receive, consolidate, and retain trade and order data; 
operate, maintain, and upgrade the central repository; and 
ensure its security and confidentiality of all reported data. 45 It 
further requires a plan processor to submit certain information 
about the order including a unique identifier for the customer 
submitting the order; the identifier of the broker-dealer 
submitting the order; the date and time of the order or event; 
and the security symbol, price, size, order type, and other 
material terms of the order.46  
 
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE TRANSPARENCY  
 
 FINRA requires each ATS to report its weekly 
aggregate volume information on a security-by-security basis 
to it. FINRA then makes the information available free of 
charge to the public on a two-week delayed basis concerning 
Tier 1 NMS stocks (stocks in the S&P Index, the Russell 1000 
Index and certain ETPs) and on all other NMS stocks and OTC 
equity securities subject to its reporting requirements two 
weeks after the initial reporting period. The list of FINRA 
equity ATS firms is set forth in Appendix A. This is a change 
from its previous policy of making the said information 
available mainly to professionals, which was based on 
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voluntary reporting by some ATSs on an aggregate, monthly 
basis. The goal is to increase market transparency and enhance 
investor confidence. Included are all dark pools’ market 
facilities and other ATS, which, as of 2014, constituted more 
than 30 percent of the total of OTC trading in U.S. exchange-
listed equities.47  
 
 The NYSE has proposed a plan to limit trades on dark 
pools by its “tick size pilot program,” which would increase a 
minimum bid to five cents from a penny with respect to stocks 
of companies with small market capitalizations. The restrictive 
change is being reviewed by the SEC, FINRA and BATAS 
Exchange Inc. have proposed less restrictive measures.48 
NASDAQ has launched a new SMARTS Surveillance for Dark 
Pools. SMARTS will enable regulators both in the U.S. and 
globally to better monitor dark trading activities. The program 
assists Multilateral Trading Facilities, ATSs, Crossing 
Networks, and market participants engaged in internalizing 
order flow or trading in dark pools to monitor alleged abusive 
behavior therein. According to its website, it delivers full 
cross-market surveillance, unfettered visibility and 
transparency for dark trading and a means to prevent abusive 
manipulative behavior that may lead to abuse.49 It is part of a 
larger NASDAQ surveillance endeavor for surveillance for 
marketplaces and regulators, market participants, foreign 
exchange, and energy.50  
 
 The regulatory trend towards greater transparency may 
lead to greater risks, which were the reasons for dark pool 
origination. Such trend has caused dark pools to undergo a 
“toxicity assessment” whereby users may become subject to 
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manipulation by HFTs and others and face potential significant 
fines for alleged violation of the multiplicity of US federal and 
state regulations and the increased regulatory oversight by 
global authorities.51 Another trend, perhaps having Barclays 
and Credit Suisse in mind as well as the increasing regulatory 
oversight, is the launch of Luminex Trading and Analytics 
LLC in October 2015. Luminex is a dark pool consortium 
engaged in large block trading of shares originated by T. Rowe 
Price and Invesco and joined in by Blackrock J.P. Morgan 
Asset Management, Vanguard, Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management and numerous other major financial players. 
Luminex alleges in its website that it is a “dark pool with the 
lights on.” It claims to be the first ATS to launch in an era of 
complete transparency with 100 percent transparency and 
compliant with all federal and state regulations. It sought to 
limit transactions costs and profit-driven conflicts of interests 
by removing broker-dealers and by limiting pre-trade 
information.52  
 
FUTURE REGULATORY TRENDS  
 
 The election of Donald J. Trump as President of the 
U.S., coupled with a Republican-led U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives, have created substantial uncertainty as to 
whether any or substantial regulatory enactments will be 
disbanded. As President-Elect stated: “I will formulate a rule 
which says that for every one regulation, two old regulations 
must be eliminated.” He further advised his transition team to 
formulate executive actions designed “to restore our laws and 
bring back our jobs.” 53 As in all campaign rhetoric, it is 
difficult to separate hyperbole from future action, but it 
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remains clear that the Administration will be conservative-
oriented, which most often believes that many regulatory 
measures act as an impediment to economic growth. Calls to 
end both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act54 and 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act55 will likely result in the said Acts be amended rather than 
repealed. It appears that the authority of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council will be substantially diminished and banks 
will be given much greater freedom from regulations.56 
 
 An SEC Commissioner, Luis A. Aguilar noted that 
ATSs will continue to play a major role in the future and 
identified that the issues include:  
 
(1) Given that average trade sizes on dark pools that trade 
equities are comparable to the same levels seen on the 
exchanges, does it differ for large-cap and smaller cap stocks 
and should block trading be rethought to account for the 
algorithm-driven trading that dominates the current markets?  
 
(2) Can ATSs attract sufficient liquidity to remain viable 
without engaging in misconduct and can it survive without 
high frequency and algorithm traders?  
 
(3) Does the current regulatory structure favor the expansion of 
dark pools and, if so, should the SEC should limit its growth or 
curb the volume of orders executed in dark pools as Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive II, discussed infra, will do for 
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smaller orders in Europe?; 
 
(4) Are ATSs the best model for block trading and, if not, what 
other approaches would be better suited? 57 
 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF DARK POOLS 
 
IOSCO 
 
 The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) in its Principles on Dark Liquidity, set 
forth its guidance for securities markets authorities concerning 
dark liquidity. The ostensible purposes for the guidance is to 
minimize the impact of dark pools and orders on the ability of 
investors to ascertain the actual price of securities traded by 
promoting pre- and post-trading transparency by the 
encouragement of transparency orders.  Such measures are 
designed to mitigate the effect of potential fragmentation of 
information and liquidity; ensure that regulators have access to 
adequate information concerning dark pools and dark orders 
for surveillance and monitoring purposes; and ensure that 
market participants have sufficient information to ascertain 
how their orders are handled and executed. The principles are 
stated in Appendix B.58 
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European Union 
 
 Dark pools have accounted for approximately 9.1 
percent of stock trades in 2016, or three times the number of 
trades from 2010.59 The increase has created concerns among 
EU regulators, who prefer trades in “lit” markets. The EU 
enacted Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID 
II/MiFIR), which will come into effect on January 3, 2018 and 
will impose substantial regulatory limits on such trading 
venues. Limits to be imposed include four percent of overall 
trading in an individual security and eight percent of overall 
volume of each security with exceptions for trades of large 
orders.60  
 
 It is expected that dark pools will be affected in 
significant ways, including the limitation of brokers to cross 
client orders internally as a result of the closure of Broker 
Crossing Networks; moreover, in addition to the four and eight 
percent limitations, execution of orders will be limited at its 
midpoint.61 Additional requirements include major increases in 
the types of financial instruments, entities required to report, 
and an increase of the number of fields within a transaction 
report that has to be provided (from 24 to 81).62 Some 
commentators have expressed reservations concerning 
MiFID’s alleging that the regulation arose from the financial 
crisis at the end of the last decade, but that dark pools had 
nothing to do with the crash. The allegations include the 
misplaced requirements for transparency that have lost sight of 
the interest of the ultimate investor; that the impact on price 
formation is unknown and the imposition of caps was at the 
behest of demands by the exchange lobby.63  
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Switzerland 
 
 Swiss authorities are not bound by the new regulation 
inasmuch as the country is not a member of the EU. But, it is 
bound by its Financial Market Infrastructure Act, which 
imposes no such limits upon its dark pools. Thus, unless the 
EU interposes an objection to the Swiss Act, Swiss shares 
traded by EU firms on Swiss@Mid will have an advantage 
over comparable shares within the EU.64  
 
 
Brexit 
 
 The issue arises whether and to what extent dark pool 
trades will be affected by the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) exit 
(Brexit) from the EU by virtue of a referendum within the U.K. 
on June 23, 2016. Initially, Morgan Stanley’s MS Pool and 
Deutsche Bank’s SuperX, and other major dark pools were 
compelled to suspend trading, which unlike public exchanges, 
could not handle the volume of trades immediately after the 
vote, even though there was a rebound shortly thereafter. Some 
commentators stated that this was illustrative of the superiority 
of trades on public exchanges over dark pools.65  
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Hong Kong 
 
 Perhaps reflecting the worldwide trend of placing 
restrictions upon dark pools, Hong Kong imposed new 
regulations that substantially created greater transparency 
therein.66 The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission 
imposed new rules that barred retail investors from trading in 
dark pools thereby preventing all but large institutional 
investors, such as fund managers and professional and 
experienced investors with at least HK $8 million portfolios. 
The move affected Hong Kong’s 15 dark pools, which now 
requires brokers to prioritize client trades over proprietary 
orders and exercise operational controls. Other restrictions 
include the requirement that dark pools must be members of its 
stock exchange thereby reducing competition with publicly 
traded securities. Among the dark pool operations affected are 
those of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse.67 
 
Canada 
 
 The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization 
(IIRO) of Canada issued a ruling in 2012 that sought to 
maintain the integrity of the pricing process by requiring small 
orders in dark pools to meet certain pricing standards and 
provide a level of playing field in the same marketplace for 
dark and lit orders. While acknowledging that there were 
additional costs as a result of its rules and a significant drop in 
dark pool trades; nevertheless, the IIRO found that there was 
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no statistically significant deterioration in market quality.68 The 
changes issued by the Organization according to Liquidnet, a 
global institutional trading network, are: visible order priority, 
(i.e., these orders had priority over orders from dark pools at 
the same price and same marketplace) and meaningful price 
improvement (i.e., order below block size by a dark pool had to 
be better (one cent) than the displayed quote by one trading 
increment).  Another significant change gave the IIRO the right 
to designate a minimum size for dark orders. The changes in 
Canada continued to preserve the execution of large orders by 
institutional investors, such as long-term pension and other 
comparable investors. The ability to execute large orders 
anonymously was not affected by the rules.69  
 
CONCLUSION 
The financial markets will continue to search for new 
sources of liquidity to finance the expansion of world trade. As 
is historically evident, investors and financial market experts 
will continue to explore a multitude of methodologies to 
enhance financial benefits by devising schemes to avoid 
regulatory oversight and operate privately to maximize 
financial returns. The presidential election of 2016 and the 
assumption of office by a president who advocates the removal 
of two regulations for each one created, raises the question of 
whether there will be a diminishment of regulatory oversight 
that results in harm to unknowing investors from new schemes 
designed to maximize the benefits to the principals who create 
them. It must be left to future developments to determine 
whether governmental intervention will be required to prevent 
the economic chaos that occurred in the latter part of the first 
decade of the new century.  
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APPENDIX A 
FINRA LIST OF EQUITY ALTERNATIVE TRADING 
SYSTEM FIRMS70 
 
ATS Name 
ATS 
ID 
Firm Name 
Comm
ent 
AQUA 
AQU
A 
AQUA 
SECURITIES 
L.P. 
  
GLOBAL OTC 
ARC
A 
ARCHIPELA
GO 
TRADING 
SERVICES, 
INC. 
  
AX TRADING, 
LLC 
AXT
N 
AX 
TRADING, 
LLC 
  
BARCLAYS ATS 
("LX") 
LAT
S 
BARCLAYS 
CAPITAL 
INC. 
  
BARCLAYS 
DIRECTEX 
BCD
X 
BARCLAYS 
CAPITAL 
INC. 
Used 
LEHM 
prior to 
Jan 26, 
2015 
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BIDS TRADING BIDS 
BIDS 
TRADING 
L.P. 
  
TRADEBOOK 
BTB
K 
BLOOMBER
G 
TRADEBOOK 
LLC 
Ceased 
on 
Septem
ber 1, 
2016 
APOGEE 
APO
G 
CITADEL 
SECURITIES 
LLC 
Ceased 
on 
April 2, 
2015 
CITI CROSS 
CXC
X 
CITIGROUP 
GLOBAL 
MARKETS 
INC. 
  
CitiBLOC 
CBL
C 
CITIGROUP 
GLOBAL 
MARKETS 
INC. 
  
LIQUIFI LQFI 
CITIGROUP 
GLOBAL 
MARKETS 
INC. 
Ceased 
on 
Novem
ber 7, 
2016 
CODA 
MARKETS, INC. 
PDQ
X 
CODA 
f/k/a 
PDQ 
ATS 
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MILLENNIUM 
NYF
X 
CONVERGEX 
EXECUTION 
SOLUTIONS 
LLC 
  
VORTEX 
VRT
X 
CONVERGEX 
EXECUTION 
SOLUTIONS 
LLC 
Ceased 
on 
Octobe
r 1, 
2015 
CROSSFINDER 
CRO
S 
CREDIT 
SUISSE 
SECURITIES 
(USA) LLC 
  
LIGHT POOL LTPL 
CREDIT 
SUISSE 
SECURITIES 
(USA) LLC 
Ceased 
on 
Decem
ber 1, 
2016 
NXP DFIN 
Dash Financial 
LLC 
  
DBOT ATS, LLC 
DBO
X 
DBOT ATS, 
LLC 
  
DEALERWEB 
DLT
A 
DEALERWEB 
INC. 
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SUPERX 
DBA
X 
DEUTSCHE 
BANK 
SECURITIES 
INC. 
  
LEVEL ATS 
EBX
L 
EBX LLC   
FANTEX 
BROKERAGE 
SERVICES, LLC 
FTE
X 
FANTEX 
BROKERAGE 
SERVICES, 
LLC 
Ceased 
Septem
ber 2, 
2016 
FNC AG STOCK, 
LLC 
FNC
A 
FNC AG 
STOCK, LLC 
  
SIGMA X 
SGM
A 
GOLDMAN 
SACHS 
EXECUTION 
& 
CLEARING, 
L.P. 
  
SIGMA X2 
SGM
T 
GOLDMAN, 
SACHS & CO 
  
IEX IEXG 
IEX 
SERVICES 
LLC 
Ceased 
Septem
ber 2, 
2016 
2018 / Shedding Light on Dark Pools / 102 
 
INSTINET 
CONTINUOUS 
BLOCK 
CROSSING 
SYSTEM (CBX) 
ICBX 
INSTINET, 
LLC 
  
INSTINET 
CROSSING 
XIST 
INSTINET, 
LLC 
Used 
INCA 
prior to 
Jun 16, 
2014 
IBKR ATS IATS 
INTERACTIV
E BROKERS 
LLC 
  
POSIT ITGP ITG INC.   
JPM-X 
JPM
X 
J.P. MORGAN 
SECURITIES 
LLC 
  
JET-X JEFX 
JEFFERIES 
EXECUTION 
SERVICES, 
INC. 
Ceased 
on 
April 1, 
2016 
KCG MATCHIT 
KCG
M 
KCG 
AMERICAS 
LLC 
  
LIQUIDNET ATS 
LQN
T 
LIQUIDNET, 
INC. 
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LIQUIDNET H2O 
LQN
A 
LIQUIDNET, 
INC. 
  
LUMINEX 
TRADING & 
ANALYTICS 
LLC 
LMN
X 
LUMINEX 
TRADING & 
ANALYTICS 
LLC 
  
MERRILL 
LYNCH (ATS-1) 
MLV
X 
MERRILL 
LYNCH, 
PIERCE, 
FENNER & 
SMITH INC 
Ceased 
on June 
1, 2016 
INSTINCT X 
MLI
X 
MERRILL 
LYNCH, 
PIERCE, 
FENNER & 
SMITH INC 
  
MS POOL (ATS-
4) 
MSP
L 
MORGAN 
STANLEY & 
CO. LLC 
  
MS RETAIL 
POOL (ATS-6) 
MSR
P 
MORGAN 
STANLEY & 
CO. LLC 
  
MS 
TRAJECTORY 
CROSS (ATS-1) 
MST
X 
MORGAN 
STANLEY & 
CO. LLC 
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CROSSSTREAM 
XST
M 
NATIONAL 
FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
LLC 
  
OTC LINK ATS 
OTC
R 
OTC LINK 
LLC 
  
PRO 
SECURITIES 
ATS 
PRO
S 
PRO 
SECURITIES, 
L.L.C. 
  
RIVERCROSS 
RCS
L 
RIVER 
CROSS 
SECURITES, 
LP 
Ceased 
on 
Februar
y 1, 
2017 
BLOCKCROSS 
BLK
X 
STATE 
STREET 
GLOBAL 
MARKETS, 
LLC 
Used 
PULX 
prior to 
Feb 2, 
2015 
TRIPLESHOT 
TSB
X 
TRIPLESHOT
, LLC 
Ceased 
on 
March 
1, 2016 
UBS ATS 
UBS
A 
UBS 
SECURITIES 
LLC 
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USTOCKTRADE 
SECURITIES, 
INC. 
UST
K 
USTOCKTRA
DE 
SECURITIES, 
INC. 
  
VARIABLE 
INVESTMENT 
ADVISORS, INC. 
ATS (VIAATS) 
VIAT 
VARIABLE 
INVESTMEN
T ADVISORS, 
INC. 
  
XE 
WDN
X 
WEEDEN & 
CO.L.P. 
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APPENDIX B 
IOSCO PRINCIPLES ON DARK LIQUIDITY 
 
Transparency to Market Participants and Issuers  
 
Principle 1: The price and volume of firm orders should 
generally be transparent to the public. However, regulators may 
choose not to require pre-trade transparency for certain types of 
market structures and orders. In these circumstances, they 
should consider the impact of doing so on price discovery, 
fragmentation, fairness and overall market quality. 
  
Principle 2: Information regarding trades, including those 
executed in dark pools or as a result of dark orders entered in 
transparent markets, should be transparent to the public. With 
respect to the specific information that should be made 
transparent, regulators should consider both the positive and 
negative impact of identifying a dark venue and/or the fact that 
the trade resulted from a dark order. 
 
Priority of Transparent Orders  
 
Principle 3: In those jurisdictions where dark trading is 
generally permitted, regulators should take steps to support the 
use of transparent orders rather than dark orders executed on 
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transparent markets or orders submitted into dark pools. 
Transparent orders should have priority over dark orders at the 
same price within a trading venue.  
 
Reporting to Regulators  
 
Principle 4: Regulators should have a reporting regime and/or 
means of accessing information regarding orders and trade 
information in venues that offer trading in dark pools or dark 
orders.  
 
Information Available to Market Participants about Dark 
Pools and Dark Orders  
 
Principle 5: Dark pools and transparent markets that offer dark 
orders should provide market participants with sufficient 
information so that they are able to understand the manner in 
which their orders are handled and executed.  
 
Regulation of the Development of Dark Pools and Dark 
Orders  
 
Principle 6: Regulators should periodically monitor the 
development of dark pools and dark orders in their jurisdictions 
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to seek to ensure that such developments do not adversely 
affect the efficiency of the price formation process, and take 
appropriate action as needed. 
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